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28 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham

VIA

:



SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirements: An Organizational Process Problem

1. On 21 August 1974 you requested that I review the attached material and provide you with

a. an analysis of the "requirements problem," and

b. a recommended course of action to fix the problem. This was to be accomplished prior to your departure as D/DCI/IC.

2. Based upon the information provided to me and discussions I have had with others on the IC Staff who have authored papers on the subject, what follows is my reaction to the problem of rationalizing the requirements, collection tasking and production processes of the Intelligence Community in a more systematic way.

3. In all of the material I have read, I am most influenced by the arguments outlined in the IC Staff study of August 1973 entitled The USIB Committee Survey Task Group Report. The Task Group found that:

"The issuance of collection 'requirements' and 'guidance' by most committees tends to be an ineffective use of committee time and resources for the following reasons:

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a. Such requirements are generally uncoordinated with respect to any integrated collection guidance system or objective strategy.

b. Most substantive intelligence requirements lack a common prioritization base and/or have no prioritization indication at all.

c. For the most part, these requirements do not actually drive collection programs and are not structured for collector performance evaluation.

d. They are often viewed as merely necessary outputs to show that 'collection requirements' exist, although it is unofficially recognized that they have little or no operative impact upon collection system decision behavior and actions."

In addition to these conclusions, I am persuaded by a series of DCI Letters of Instruction to USIB Committee Chairmen that have been issued over the past several weeks. In each instance, the DCI has called for the USIB Committee Chairman to pay close attention to the requirements problem and to work closely with the D/DCI/IC and D/DCI/NIO in resolving requirements issues.

4. These documents led me to conclude the following:

a. The USIB Committee Study goes to the heart of the matter and may fix the problem in the long run;

b. The individual DCI letters of Instruction appear to be a piecemeal approach and postpones "fixing" the problem until some future date.

5. I do not intend to summarize or repeat arguments or proposals made by others who have studied this problem, but rather to recommend some affirmative specific action, that in my view, would remedy the problem as it has been characterized.

6. In making this recommendation to you, I am imposing the following criteria:

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- a. ensure that the design for the Committee structure is simple enough to be understood by all;
- b. ensure that the structure is flexible enough to be changed;
- c. ensure that the structure is responsive to the DCI's needs, as reflected by the NIO's; and
- d. ensure that the design is such that one can evaluate it at the end of a two year period.

7. Recommend the following actions be taken:

a. Adopt Alternative A of the USIB Committee Survey Task Group Report of August 1973 for reasons outlined in the document on page 10 (see attachment 1).

b. Coordinate with the D/DCI/NIO, memorandum for USIB Principals, which would implement Alternative A above, entitled Establishment of USIB Committees to Support the NIO's (see attachment 2).

8. This is another view of a complex issue. I hope it is of some help to you.

[Redacted]  
Captain, USAF  
DCI/IC/CS

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Attachments:

1. USIB Committee Report
2. Draft Memo to USIB
3. Background Package on Requirements

K1A DCI/IC/CS/S/[Redacted] (28 Aug 74)

Distribution:

- 1 - Addee
- 2 - AD/DCI/IC (hold)
- ✓ 3 - IC/Registry
- 4 - CS Subj.
- 5 - CS Chrono
- 6 - [Redacted] Chrono

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28 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Establishment of USIB Committees to Support the NIOs

1. During the several months since I established the NIOs, there have been some disconnects in actions the NIOs have taken because of the lack of a USIB structure to deal with the subject. The result has been that several of the NIOs have created informal "USIB" committees.
2. I propose to formalize these efforts and to establish ten new USIB committees to assist the NIOs in the coordination of Community substantive and operational matters. These committees will serve two prime purposes:
  - a. They will insure a collaborative approach to problems.
  - b. They will keep USIB principals informed of Community actions in the NIO area.
3. I propose creation of a USIB committee for each geographic area covered by an NIO. These committees would be chaired by the appropriate NIO with membership to consist of one representative

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from CIA, DIA, INR, and IC Staff, plus military service representation as recommended by the Director, DIA. Each committee will have only a two year charter to operate, continuation subject to my approval. Separate committees would be established for:

Soviet Union/Eastern Europe

PRC

Southeast Asia

Western Europe

Middle East

☐ East Asia

Latin America

4. I further propose to have a USIB committee for each functional subject for which an NIO has been named, as follows:

a. Economic Intelligence Committee

To remain as presently constituted, with the addition of the NIO for Economics as chairman and an IC Staff officer as member.

b. Energy Committee

To be chaired by the NIO for Energy, with membership to consist of one representative from CIA, DIA, INR, Treasury and IC Staff.

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c. Strategic Programs Committee

To be chaired by the NIO for Strategic Programs with membership to consist of one representative from CIA, DIA, INR, AEC, Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, the chairmen of GMAIC, JAEIC, SIC and IC Staff will be ex officio members.

d. Conventional Forces Committee

To be chaired by the NIO for Conventional Forces, with membership to consist of one representative from DIA, CIA, NSA, INR, and IC Staff and sub-committee chairmen from Army, Navy and Air Force. The DIA representative will be the Deputy Chairman. Three sub-committees are proposed as follows:

(1) General Purpose Ground Forces Sub-Committee

Chairman to be provided by the ACSI, Army, with membership to consist of one representative from CIA, DIA, NSA, NPIC and IC Staff.

(2) General Purpose Naval Forces Sub-Committee

Chairman to be provided by the DNI, with membership to consist of one representative from CIA, DIA, NSA, NPIC and IC Staff.

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(3) General Purpose Air Forces Sub-Committee

Chairman to be provided by the ACSI, Air Force, with membership to consist of one representative from CIA, DIA, NSA, NPIC and IC Staff.

5." I would like to have your comments on this proposal by

\_\_\_\_\_.

W. E. Colby  
Chairman, USIB

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28 August 1974

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\_\_\_\_\_.

W. E. Colby  
Chairman, USIB

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DCI Executive Committee

1. Mr. Colby has described the role of the National Intelligence Officers as being his alter ego in their specific areas of geographic or substantive concern. This charge connotes interest in and certain responsibility for identifying and for stating requirements, guiding collection by pertinent disciplines, being aware of and coordinating analytical, production and estimative capabilities, and evaluating the quality and responsiveness toward satisfaction of substantive objectives. Some concern for adequacy of resource levels is evident also.

2. It is obvious that the skeleton staffs which comprise each NIO cannot perform all of these functions directly or fully. Instead, their role must be one of awareness, coordination, and influence among the various elements and structures of the Intelligence Community which have varying forms of responsibility for these actions. All of these functions are performed in one degree or another by the individual agencies, departments and offices making up the Intelligence Community. The U.S. Intelligence Board is the organizational capstone on which all of the Community elements are represented. The Committee structure of the USIB comprises the various subject and functional arms in which all Community elements participate, as appropriate, to conduct the staff work for USIB.

3. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee is the Community resources management body supporting the DCI. The sub-structure of the IRAC is less diversified than that of the USIB, involving only a general Working Group, an R&D Council and an Information Working Group. Thus, there is heavy dependence by the IRAC for certain resource management actions which are staffed by the USIB Committees in support of IRAC or USIB or both. This relationship of USIB Committees to IRAC has not been specifically set forth in the DCI directives (DCIDs) which constitute the charters for the individual USIB Committees, but has been conveyed orally.

4. The IC Staff represents yet another structure under the DCI for the performance of certain functions and coordination actions beyond the purview or capability of the NIOs and the USIB Committees. The IC Staff functions principally in the area of planning, resource program development and review, collection and processing assessment, product review and the compilation and analysis of community management information. These functions of necessity interface with the NIOs, the USIB Committees, all Community organizations and certain other organizations and activities which are not directly included as members of the intelligence community. JCS, NSC, OMB

5. The responsibilities and functions of the USIB and its committees are reasonably well documented. The responsibilities and

functions of IRAC and its sub-structure are less well documented.

There is no specific documentation on the responsibilities and functions of the NIO structure or the IC Staff.

6. Throughout the organizations and committees making up the Intelligence Community management superstructure, there are several fundamental functions for which specific authority or coordination responsibility is obscure. Some of these functions are overall requirements management, overall collection management, resource effectiveness evaluations, and intelligence value assessments. None of these broad functions appears to fall within the responsibility of any of the existing community staff or committee elements, although partial responsibility is assigned to one or another of these elements.

7. One solution to these problems would be the creation of additional USIB Committees to deal with them on a full-time basis. Alternatively, recognition should be given to existing Committees which deal with parts of these problems (SIGINT, COMIREX, HUMINT, CCPC, etc.) and the capabilities and responsibilities of the IC Staff and NIOs.

8. This suggests the need for a DCI executive coordination committee which would be responsible for bringing together all the functional capabilities in an interrelated and coordinated manner for the DCI. Such a DCI Executive Committee should have represented on it individuals responsible for the broad functions charged to USIB,

IRAC, the NIOs and the IC Staff and should visibly include both Defense and DCI-level responsibilities. Candidates for membership would be:

- D/DCI/IC
- D/DCI/NIO
- Chairman, IRAC Working Group
- A Senior Representative from DIA
- SIGINT Committee Chairman
- COMIREX Chairman
- HUMINT Committee Chairman
- Requirements Committee Chairman (if formed)
- Other USIB and IRAC Committee/Working Group Chairmen on ad hoc basis
- Individual NIOs on ad hoc basis

9. The Community-wide nature of the Committee's authority and responsibility indicates the D/DCI/IC as Chairman, and the need for Defense visibility indicates the senior representative from DIA (representing both the SecDef and JCS) as Vice Chairman. The Executive Secretary of the Committee should logically be the Chief of the Coordination Staff on the IC Staff.

*CIA and State, and perhaps Treasury, would desire membership to counter-balance DIA participation, but I would argue against the need. ASDM might claim the right to do membership since DIA, but I would argue against that. OMB might also desire participation.*



STAT

Executive Summary  
74-1604

DCI/IC 74-069  
19 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: USIB Committees Supporting NIOs

1. You will recall that sometime ago you instructed me to reactivate the proposition to set up new USIB committees for the purpose of support to the NIOs. Attached is a draft of a proposition to do that.

2. I discussed this with George Carver who had reservations about making the change at this time. George sees this as an eventual solution but would prefer a less structured approach at this time. Some of the NIOs have de facto USIB committees assisting them now and others will probably accumulate such groups as they go. George further expressed his doubt that Admiral de Poix would support establishing the committees. I discussed it with de Poix and that was a fact; de Poix is strongly opposed to the idea.

3. In view of the above, I believe we should let the issue lie dormant for awhile, perhaps bringing it up this fall. I continue to believe that the structure would be useful for two primary reasons: First, it would provide a tasking mechanism for the NIOs which would help ease the strain of carrying the KIQ/KEP load; secondly, it would tend to solve some of the institutional problems in the NIO business at levels lower than USIB itself.

4. Other USIB committee structure issues that are being addressed now are:

- The continuation of the Human Sources Committee.
- Review of the SIGINT Committee structure.
- The dissolution of the CCPC.

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- A recommendation by [ ] to divest SIC of the responsibility for covering existing weapons systems (aircraft, BW-CW, etc.) in order to concentrate on the more purely scientific problems such as lasers. This involves a recommendation to form a weapons technology committee fed by JAEIC and GMAIC to address existent systems. There is a good deal of merit in this proposition in my view.

- The expansion of the Security Committee charter which you will be addressing at the next USIB.

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[ ]  
Daniel O. Graham  
Lieutenant General, USA  
D/DCI/IC

Attachment

DRAFT Memo for USIB  
Principals, 29 Apr 74

## The Intelligence Requirements Process

### Introduction

The term "intelligence requirements" is perhaps the most frequently used and also the most frequently misused term in the lexicon of the intelligence community. "Requirements" can cover the spectrum from broad statements of intelligence production needs to the specific information sought in the tasking of an individual collector or technical sensor. In every instance, a stated requirement is used as the basis for creating or operating a collection resource; for processing, analyzing or exploiting the collected data; and for synthesizing, evaluating and reporting single or multiple source information in a product which can range from a spot report to an in-depth study or a national estimate..

The full range of requirements reflect the insatiable appetites of the intelligence consumers, the intelligence managers and the intelligence analysts. Most, if not all, requirements are stated without regard for satisfaction capability, feasibility, complexity or cost. Few, if any, stated requirements are ever fully satisfied; those which may be satisfied usually give rise to further and more detailed statements of need or desire or to regeneration of the requirement for up-dating purposes. Thus, the volume of requirements continues to multiply in proportion to the satisfaction achieved.

Apart from relatively superficial "validation" procedures, no particular effort is made to challenge or reject requirements statements, nor is the originator ever informed of the feasibility, complexity or cost of meeting a stated requirement. In this aspect, the requirements process can be viewed as a huge juggernaut with no brakes and few effective control mechanisms.

Prioritizing or priorordering of requirements is another imponderable which detracts from the effectiveness of the process in most instances. The plethora of requirements originators and the wide range of responsibilities they represent adds confusion and conflict to judgments of priority.

### Process versus System

So far, I have referred to the requirements "process". It would be preferable to refer to it as the "system". However, a system by definition is "a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole" with the connotation of an organization serving a common purpose and under specific leadership. Except for small segments of the present process which are systematized, the total process does not appear to meet the "system" criteria. To make the process a system should perhaps be one of our basic objectives.

### Elements of the Process

The requirements process can best be understood when viewed in terms of sequential steps which become separable elements in the process. In broad terms these are:

Objectives or Goals -- general statements, usually reflecting end results; relatively few in number and preferably in some order of priority or emphasis; correspond to what are otherwise described as First Order Requirements. Existing example is DCID 1/2 and corresponding JCS JSOP Annex A.

Statements of Requirements or Information Needs -- Expansion of general objectives into more specific descriptions of information needed to support intelligence analysis and product; not directed at any specific collection, processing or analysis discipline; not in priority order except as derived from general objectives; correspond to Second Order Requirements. Existing examples are Key Intelligence Questions, Defense Intelligence Requirements, Essential Elements of Information (EEI) stated in Unified Command war and contingency plans.

Guidance (to collectors, processors, analysts) -- probably the least-defined element of the process; involves directing requirements or information needs to one or more collection disciplines based on judgment of most likely sources to provide data in timely and useable form; also serves as management mechanism for processors and analysts; determination of essentiality of one collection source over others is part of guidance. Existing examples are SORS mission guidance to Directors, NRO and NSA; COMIREX guidance to NRO, Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming (IGCP).

Tasking -- A further detailing of requirements or information need statements into specific tasks to be performed by individual collectors or sensors in consideration of guidance provided; equates to Third Order Requirements in detail of observables, circuits to be covered or targets to be photographed. This element is best carried out by the collection resource manager who can marry the data needs with the technical or access capability of the collector or sensor. Examples are NSA SIGINT system tasking, technical tasking of overhead systems, or specific intelligence tasks levied on HUMINT collectors.

### Interrelationships of the Process

In an ideal world, the elements of the process identified above should provide for requirements development to flow in an orderly progression of sequential steps, each detailed statement or action at any level



being relatable to something at the next higher level. Unfortunately, this does not now occur, and it is difficult if not impossible in many cases to trace tasks, guidance and information needs back to requirements and broad objectives. This is true for two principal reasons:

- many originators of requirements have direct access to collection and processing systems without review by any central authority, and
- there is no central authority or structured mechanism through which requirements can pass for validation, association and the provision of guidance.

For example, the centralization of the SIGINT system over the past several years and the provision by NSA of direct service in place of direct support necessitates all commands making known to NSA their SIGINT requirements. Commanders are afforded the opportunity to originate and state these requirements directly to NSA, keeping DIA informed. But no challenge is offered to the validity or relative priority of such requirements, and there is no procedure whereby they are associated with corresponding or possibly conflicting requirements levied on the SIGINT systems from other sources, either other commands or national (Washington-level) authorities. The total of all requirements thus received by NSA clearly exceeds the resource and technical capability of the SIGINT system to respond in an effective and timely manner. This results in the claim that NSA is failing to fulfill many requirements.

In the imagery collection and exploitation endeavor, the requirement and guidance procedure is much more orderly as the result of a central authority (COMIREX) which receives all requirements, prioritizes them, and provides for collection and processing action in accordance with system capabilities. In a sense, the comparison of the SIGINT system to the imagery system is unfair and unrealistic. Imagery acquisition involves a relatively few systems constrained only by vehicle availability and weather. Success (requirement satisfaction) is a "yes" or "no" proposition. Target denial or target security measures are not significant factors inhibiting collection. SIGINT collection, on the other hand, is a highly complex mixture of human and technical systems operating in a deliberately non-cooperative environment with success attributable to educated technical tasking, tedious monitoring, fortuitousness and technical competence in processing. Few requirements are ever completely satisfied and many exceed even the best of the system capabilities.

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the major problems confronting the intelligence community in requirements management pertain to the SIGINT system.

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When is a Requirement not a Requirement?

There is one school of thought in the intelligence community that a stated requirement which exceeds our technical or human capability to satisfy should not be "validated" and levied for collection or processing action. I reject this view. Any requirement for substantive response should be stated and accepted whether or not a capability exists to operate against it. The lack of a current capability could, for example, cause necessary research and development to be undertaken toward creation of a capability. At the same time, we should recognize that some of our most pressing requirements are not likely to ever be satisfied. That fact, however, is not sufficient to deny that the requirement exists.

This brings into play the need for prioritizing and the careful provision of guidance in the application of resources toward requirements satisfaction. The objectives or goals element of the requirements process provides a general priority framework within which second and third order requirements can and should be fit. To do so effectively requires, among other things, that all stated requirements (second order) be reviewed by a central authority who is able to associate and priorder all statements. This having been done, the further provision of guidance incident to conveying the requirements into particular discipline areas can include recommendations on the emphasis of resource application consistent with overall priorities and essentiality of the source. This procedure would recognize that some lower priority requirements would receive no effort in order that appropriate effort is applied to higher priority needs. These determinations should be made by the central authority responsible for providing guidance in each discipline area. Such a procedure is already in effect for the relatively simple imagery discipline and needs to be developed for the SIGINT discipline.

To Make the Process a System

An analysis of the requirements process and its application to the principal disciplines of imagery, SIGINT and HUMINT indicates that the process lacks systematic organizational structure in the first two elements-- objectives or goals and requirements or information needs. The statements in both of these elements need to be associated, the second being derivative from and an expansion on the first. Both sets of statements need to be placed in relative priority order, irrespective of disciplines to be applied. It is suggested that there should be a USIB Requirements Committee established for these purposes.

The application of stated requirements to particular collection and processing disciplines should be accomplished by the respective committees of USIB--COMIREX, SIGINT and HUMINT--in the form of guidance to be

utilized by appropriate program managers in the allocation of resources and the assignment of operational tasking. Obviously, these procedures will take differing forms depending on the detail and nature of guidance to be provided for tasking purposes.

It seems clear that the SIGINT guidance area is the most complex. Past efforts to systematize this area have been hampered by two major shortcomings:

- a lack of detailed knowledge on the part of the SIGINT Committee concerning resources allocated and capabilities existing within the SIGINT system to respond to requirements and guidance;
- a lack of centralized access to all requirements levied on the SIGINT systems by various originators.

There is evidence that the new SIGINT Requirements Management System (SIRE) being developed by NSA, if shared with the intelligence community and the SIGINT Committee, could go a long way toward alleviating the first problem area. The nature and degree of assistance to be derived from SIRE needs to be negotiated with NSA and developed for community application. There appears to be a willingness to do this.

The "other requirements" problem is a USIB and SIGINT Committee matter involving all members, but particularly the DIA, Military Service and Treasury members. While substantial progress can be made on this problem within the SIGINT Committee, an even more effective system could evolve with the assistance of a USIB Requirements Committee.

#### Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- serious consideration be given to forming a USIB Requirements Committee to fulfill the functions discussed above;
- the SIGINT Committee Ad Hoc Review Group give particular attention to a Committee structure or sub-structure which will move toward more effective systematization of requirements for which SIGINT is judged to be an essential source, the prioritizing of these requirements, and the provision of guidance to the SIGINT program manager.

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Addendum

There is an obvious interface necessary between action recommended for the SIGINT Committee and the National SIGINT Plan under development by Director, NSA. Requirements for which SIGINT contributions are essential, resources allocated, system capabilities and an assessment of responsiveness and satisfaction are all ingredients to be considered in the Plan.


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3 June 1974


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SUBJECT:




Piece on Requirements ("The Intelligence Requirements Process" previously distributed)

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1. I intend to work Mac's paper up into a paper to be coordinated with key USIB agencies. [redacted] is getting at a fundamental question that has to be answered in order for USIB and for us to do the intelligence job correctly. We are still making resource decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements to be served. The KIQ/KEP process is going to help, but as of now it is primarily useful in pointing up the lack of a proper requirements system in the total intelligence process. Even with the KIQ/KEP process operating on a steady basis, we still have USIB failing to address its responsibilities effectively in the requirements area.

2. I have some problems with Mac's approach to the ordering of requirements. To me, a first-order requirement is one that states a fundamental need for intelligence as seen by the user. DCID 1/2 and JSOP Annex A don't quite meet this criterion. They are more on the order of broad guidance and prioritization of effort. The KIQs as presently constituted don't quite fit the criterion either. Some do; some don't. Examples of first-order requirements would be:

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- Monitor the development of Chinese advance weapons programs.
- Keep Soviet SSBNs under surveillance.
- Provide forecasts of worldwide basic food commodity availability, etc.

Perhaps I am speaking here of a better set of the old PNIOs.

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3. As far as the KIQs are concerned, it may be that they should all, in fact, be second-order requirements rather than first, since first-order requirements tend to be so broad that precision in resource expenditure against them is not feasible. Second-order requirements should be a breakdown of first-order requirements into sub-questions that must be answered in order to meet the first-order requirements. In looking over the list of KIQs presently on the books, a number of them fit in this category.

4. The third order of requirements is as Mac has stated, those specific elements of information which allow you to answer the second-order questions.

5. Naturally enough, Mac is not delving deep into the parallel problems of requirements levied on human and overt sources. This needs to be fleshed out in the paper. I would appreciate the views of [redacted] people on this matter.

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6. When we float the paper to the Pentagon we need also to address the separation of peacetime and wartime requirements. A good deal of confusion arising across the board (not just with SIGINT) in the requirements business is the admixture of wartime and contingency requirements with the peacetime requirements. Once we have established a requirements hierarchy and system for the peacetime requirements process, we should ask our Pentagon brethren to establish a parallel set for wartime contingencies involving the major commands as required. Such an approach will help [redacted] efforts in the tactical/national intelligence interrace game.

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7. I would like to get together on this problem Wednesday afternoon. (It might be useful for the 10:30 meeting on Thursday with the DCI and the NIOs reference the KIQs.)

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(Signed)  
DANIEL O. GRAHAM, LTG, USA

Daniel O. Graham  
Lieutenant General, USA  
D/DCI/IC

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DCI/IC 74-083  
3 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Harvey

SUBJECT : Some Thoughts on How to Manage  
Collection System Trade-Offs

1. In theory, and to a considerable extent in practice, the SIGINT, COMIREX, and HUMINT Committees of USIB provide coordinated requirements and collection guidance to NSA, the NRO, and the HUMINT community respectively. What is perceived to be lacking is a community mechanism to coordinate collection between and among these three separate collection systems.

2. The ability of the DCI and program managers to make rational judgments on SIGINT/Imagery/HUMINT trade-offs will depend heavily on a more effective system of evaluation than now exists but which, hopefully, will evolve from KEP. Thus, in my view, whatever mechanism is developed to staff out such judgments should be the same mechanism that makes the key judgments in the KEP process. This points inevitably to the NIOs.

3. What will happen in practice is that each NIO, after an accumulation of experience and knowledge based on the data produced by KEP, will say I need X amount of SIGINT, Y amount of Imagery, and Z amount of HUMINT to meet the needs of my bailiwick. George Carver will add up all the X's, Y's, and Z's and present the totals separately to each appropriate USIB Committee. These will be considered the highest priority, rock bottom requirements for each collection system. The Committee will be responsible for determining what additional requirements will have to be added to meet "other" legitimate needs of customers. This process will require brokering not only with the program managers of three collection systems but also consultation among the three committee chairmen and finally clearance through IRAC and USIB.

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
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4. It may be argued that the NIOs are not adequately staffed to assume this new function. In my view, it is inextricably bound up with the function they have already been assigned with respect to KEP. And it should take very few, if any, more people to do the former in addition to the latter.

5. The IC Staff, as now constituted, is not equipped to do this job. The essential ingredient, which only the NIOs are possessed of, is the capacity to make substantive judgments on what kinds of collection systems are producing the required types of intelligence to meet our highest priority needs. The IC Staff can, however, provide the resource cost data which will necessarily be required by the NIOs as an input to their substantive judgments.

6. A super-committee, consisting of the chairman of the three cognate committees, would not be in a position to make objective and independent judgments, although this might be a useful staff element under strong NIO guidance and direction as proposed in paragraph 3 above.



IC Staff

cc: AD/DCI/IC  
D/MPRRG/IC

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4 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR :



SUBJECT : Random Thoughts on Coordination  
of Collection Disciplines

1. Pursuant to last Friday's Staff meeting discussion, John Dickey and I have discussed the problem and come up with a few thoughts.

2. It has been suggested in several forums (including General Allen's discourse at the USIB Meeting of 30 May) that there be a mechanism under the USIB to coordinate the applicability of the various collection systems to a particular target. The question has been raised as to the best means of acquiring data; i.e. from HUMINT, SIGINT or Photography. How does the community determine which system is best suited for collecting specific information? In any particular situation a decision is needed as to whether they are totally independent of one another, redundant or mutually exclusive.

3. By the nature of the systems mentioned much information is unique to the specific discipline. On the other hand, under tight budgets, tasking of more than one discipline may not be cost effective. Other than the moribund CCPC no mechanism exists to sort the pieces. Even during its active days the CCPC approach tended to be problem oriented and narrow in scope even though valuable in specific cases.

4. One could argue that the KIQ/KEP innovation will provide the answers to this question. On the other hand, the KIQs are also narrow in their application and serve mainly to highlight those program managers who believe their resources can be applied to the satisfaction of the stated question or deficiency. But who determines which program manager should proceed in collecting and reporting.

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on the deficiency? The NIO structure currently is not geared to such technical determinations. The committees of USIB germane to this problem deal only in their own disciplines. While the committee system provides for inter-Committee and inter-Agency coordination it does not, for many reasons, work a good share of the time.

5. Currently, the SIGINT Committee is engaged in developing a SIGINT Requirements Mechanism to interface with NSA as the Program Manager. The proposed concept for this mechanism is in its early stages of development. It considers DCID 1/2 as a general starting point to translate requirements into SIGINT terms. Discussion of this proposal has indicated that the general nature of DCID 1/2 creates difficulties in the translation process. In addition questions have been raised as to the applicability of DCID 1/2 to the HUMINT and Photographic requirements mechanism. Here again the overall question of collection by requirements highlights the need for a coordinated approach to all disciplines.


6. There is precedent within the USIB structure for organizing appropriate chairmen of pertinent USIB committees to address cross discipline programs. This precedent could serve as a basis for a Collection Coordination Committee (CCC) to address the applicability of all collection disciplines to an intelligence requirement. Such a committee could be composed of the Chairmen of the Human Sources Committee, SIGINT and COMIREX, and be chaired by the D/DCI/NIO. The function of this committee would be to review and determine which collection discipline is best suited for a particular task. It may be that all three, SIGINT, HUMINT, and Photography will be required. On the other hand it may prove that only one will do the job. This committee should not in of itself develop requirements and/or priorities, but should apply those developed by other committees to cross discipline tasks. That is to say SIGINT, COMIREX and Human Sources Committees should continue to develop requirements and priorities. The Coordinating Committee on the other hand would, for example, determine that a particular subject justifies higher priority for Photo than for SIGINT. This Committee could also support IRAC on cross-program matters.

7. The complexity and breadth of the overall problem is so great that there is a real danger of developing a mechanism too unwieldy to do the job. Thus, some consideration should be given to having a "floating membership" for specific items, not dissimilar to Plummer and Potter's de facto membership on USIB for certain agenda items. Thus Chairmen of other Committees, IC Division Chiefs and the NIO's might sit on the CCC for certain items as appropriate.

8. In the past one problem with a Committee of Chairman has been that they are all CIA. This potential stumbling block may be avoided by the CCC with the D/DCI/NIO Chairmanship, the SIGINT Chairman's non CIA affiliation and the possibility of an HSC Chairmanship from outside the Agency.

9. The CCC concept provides the best available balance between having a Committee with the clout necessary to do this job and the expertise needed to do it right.

10. In our review we considered various approaches to this problem including a larger committee with representation from several USIB Committees. We discourage such an approach as unwieldy and unable to focus on the stated problems.

  
Executive Secretary, USIB/IRAC

4 June 1974

Thoughts on Rationalizing the  
Requirements and Collection Tasking Processes

The President, in his letter of 22 March, stated: "I am particularly concerned that the link between substantive intelligence needs and intelligence resources be clearly understood and evaluated". The most difficult problem facing the DCI in meeting this charge is that there is no such link. The main reason the Intelligence Community could never have had an effective evaluation process (assuming it wanted one) is the tremendously wide gulf between the establishment of requirements and priorities on the one hand and the allocation of resources and evaluation on the other: never the twain meet. This is a pervasive problem. It is reflected in attitudes, thought processes and even organizationally, with one group--USIB--concerned with "substance" and another--IRAC--concerned with resources.

The KEP, of course, was designed mainly to bridge this gulf and, in effect, to provide the link which so rightly concerns the President. But even when operational, the KEP will address only the tip of the iceberg, and there are major problems ahead in making it work at all.

25X1 Beneath this overall problem are other closely related obstacles to effective community management. One is the nature of the requirements process. [ ] has written on that aspect. Another, which threatens the success of the KEP itself, is the absence on the collection side of the community of any capability to review the total collection task, which, bad enough in itself, leads to still another lack: there is no structure allowing for an integrated interface between the production and collection sides of the community.

Looking at the KEP alone for a moment, this void on the collection side is perhaps the single most serious obstacle to successful implementation. Recognizing the fact that all twelve NIO's cannot effectively provide for the essential interface with collection managers, the IC Staff has provided a KEP monitor to perform this task, among others. This has worked fairly well in the relatively simple job of preparing the Baseline Reports in the pilot run. It is highly unlikely that it will work even for the Performance Reports in the pilot run and almost certain that it will not for a fully operating, steady-state KEP.

The larger problem, of course, is the lack of any meaningful overview of all collection efforts. Combined with the lack of a systematic formulation of requirements, and in the context of the overall separation between "substance" and resources/evaluation, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that as presently structured the Intelligence Community "can't get there from here". Without a soundly-based set of requirements linked to collection tasks, production output and the associated costs, it is difficult to see how the DCI can even know in any coherent way what the community is doing, why it is doing it, and how the resources are being used--much less evaluate overall performance.

Clearly some structural changes are needed.  has addressed the requirements dimension and recommended an overall Requirements Committee. A good proposal but more is needed. As I see it, there are several approaches one could take:

(1) Establish a DCI Executive Committee responsible for reviewing and validating community-wide requirements and the resultant collection tasking. The community would report directly to the DCI and be composed as follows:

- D/DCI/IC - Chairman
- Senior Representative from DIA - Vice Chairman
- D/DCI/NIO
- Chairman, SIGINT Committee
- Chairman, COMIREX
- Chairman, Human Sources Committee
- Chairman, Requirements Committee (if formed)

(2) Establish a USIB Requirements and Collection Committee (same responsibilities as in 1 above) composed as follows:

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D/DCI/IC - Chairman  
Senior Representative from DIA - Vice Chairman  
D/DCI/NIO  
Chairman, SIGINT Committee  
Chairman, COMIREX  
Chairman, Human Sources Committee  
Chairman, Requirements Committee (if formed)

(3) Establish two separate committees, one on Requirements and one on Collection, composed as follows:

Requirements Committee

Chairman designated by  
DCI with USIB advice

Members representing  
USIB members/Mil Depts

Collection Committee

Chairman designated by  
DCI with USIB advice

Members representing  
USIB members/Mil Depts

(4) Rely on the NIO's per [redacted] suggestion in his memo on this subject.



25X1 Attachment: (1) [redacted] Requirements paper  
(2) [redacted] paper on "Collection  
System Trade-offs"

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5 June 1974

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : A USIB Requirements Committee and Related Questions

25X1 1. What follows is a review and analysis of the "requirements problem" based on the material which you gave to [REDACTED] and me on 3 June.

25X1 2. [REDACTED] memorandum argues persuasively for a "central authority or structured mechanism through which requirements can pass for validation, association and the provision of guidance." The real crunch in requirements management, as he sees it, is the SIGINT system. Those who originate requirements have direct access to parts of this system without review by any central authority. [REDACTED] recommends two things: first, the formation of a USIB Requirements Committee and, second, a Committee structure or sub-structure to deal specifically with requirements levied on the SIGINT system. It appears that the specific problem of uncoordinated requirements levied on the SIGINT system could be solved by a USIB Requirements Committee. However, if a USIB Requirements Committee were formed, it might then be unnecessary to form a Committee structure or sub-structure specifically to process SIGINT requirements. The most efficient course of action is perhaps to decide first whether there should be a USIB Requirements Committee. If this is decided affirmatively, SIGINT requirements could be handled as part of all other requirements levied on collection and processing systems.

25X1 3. [REDACTED] memorandum goes deeper, perhaps, than the formation of a USIB Requirements Committee. This becomes clear when his memorandum is read in the context of the literature which has been collecting since August 1973 about USIB Committee structure. It becomes clearer still when one thinks about who would staff a Requirements Committee, how this Committee would be structurally related to the other USIB Committees as presently constituted, and particularly how a Requirements Committee would satisfy

growing intelligence community dissatisfaction with the present system. At worst, the addition of a Requirements Committee would be a makeshift piece of patchwork grafted on an already cumbersome structure. At best, a Requirements Committee would provide a short-term solution to a set of nasty problems. In this light, General Graham's memorandum to Mr. Colby, dated 22 February 1974, on "Re-examination of the USIB Committee Structure" goes right to the heart of the matter. General Graham referred to the IC study, "The USIB Committee Survey Task Group Report," upon which Mr. Colby deferred action pending the establishment of the NIO Office. General Graham reviewed the various problems raised about USIB Committees and observed that "the situation calls for more than a piece-meal approach." The addition of a Requirements Committee appears to be a "piece-meal approach" to the general problem.

4. Your attention is also called to a memorandum from Mr. Colby to USIB Principals, dated 29 April 1974, regarding the "Establishment of USIB Committees to Support the NIOs." Mr. Colby proposed, in short, the creation of a USIB committee for each geographic area covered by an NIO. If such committees were added to the present structure without a major reorganization, the result would most likely be a really complex and virtually unmanageable entity.

5. Perhaps several birds can be killed with one stone. The IC study recommended that USIB Committees be reorganized along geographic lines. Their suggested Committees are listed below in the left-hand column. The geographic areas covered by the present NIOs are listed below in the right-hand column.

IC Study Suggestions  
for USIB Committees

USSR and Warsaw Pact  
People's Republic of China  
[redacted]  
Far East and South Asia  
Southeast Asia  
Middle East and Africa  
Latin America  
Strategic Weapons and SALT  
General Purpose Forces and MBFR  
Economic Intelligence Committee

Watch Committee  
Security Committee

Present NIOs

USSR and East Europe  
China  
Western Europe  
[redacted] Pacific  
Southeast Asia  
Middle East  
Latin America  
Strategic Programs  
Conventional Forces  
Economics  
Special Activities



This almost complete correspondence is very suggestive. If the plan proposed in the IC study were adopted, each NIO could be the chairman of the corresponding USIB Committee. This would implement Mr. Colby's plan as stated in his 29 April memorandum.

6. The IC study also recommended the establishment of support groups as follows: The IREX Support Group; The SIGINT Support Group; The Human Sources Support Group; and The Foreign Science and Technology Group. This recommendation could connect with the requirements issue in the following ways. The NIOs could function as the USIB Requirements Committee, subject to the review of the USIB. All requirements would be processed through this Requirements Committee. The establishment of priorities and the precisizing of requirements from first-order to second-order would be done by the Committee. The levying and further precisizing of collection and processing requirements could be done through the four Support Groups.

7. The advantages of such a system are as follows. First, the USIB Committees could be staffed along intelligence community lines, insuring the full participation of member agencies at the national level. Second, the Requirements Committee of NIOs would insure the coordination of requirements levied on the community by intelligence consumers. Third, this Requirements Committee could serve as the focal point of communication between intelligence consumers, on the one hand, and the collection and processing systems, on the other hand. Fourth, priorities in requirements could be settled or negotiated directly with intelligence consumers. Fifth, interaction with collection and processing systems could be handled by means of the four Support Groups. The Support Groups could function as brokers of requirements from the Requirements Committee to the collection and processing systems. Further, these Support Groups could translate second-order into third-order requirements. Finally, the interaction between the four Support Groups and actual collection and processing systems could concentrate on translating third-order into fourth-order requirements. This picture would give clear sense to the different orders of requirements and, if implemented, would provide a central authority and mechanism for translating and processing the needs of the intelligence consumer to all elements of the community which work to satisfy those needs.

DCI/IC 74-090

7 June 1974

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirements Process

1. The matrix of judgments about intelligence "requirements" has tended to operate with several unspoken assumptions. There is a need to define and include formally some additional criteria in order to arrive at a more precise and economical application of resources. The intelligence community cannot make some of the key judgments alone, and perhaps should not try to make them independently.

2. For about 25 years a great proportion of our judgments have been subtly but perceptibly influenced by the idea that, given our power and will to exert influence and "leadership" in world affairs, the U.S. would be most likely to become involved in any situation of much significance. We therefore felt the need to maintain a very large data base in order to support the widest array of options for action, should policy and decision makers choose to involve themselves and the nation in a given subject. It seems safe to say now that there is a general recognition that our relative ability to act has declined, and our will to do so is not lightly to be assumed. We will increasingly tend to examine a situation carefully before deciding whether or not we must become involved, or could advantageously take some action. And when we decide to act, we are more likely now to do so in a political or economic policy sense rather than in the kinds of material ways we often launched some years ago.

3. The definition of the factors that need to be cranked more formally into "requirements" judgments needs some study, but I suggest there are perhaps three elements: the probability of occurrence of the situation to which the requirement is linked; the relative impact on U.S. national interests of that situation; and the relative importance to the type of response the U.S. seems most likely to make, of the specific information addressed in the requirement.

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4. I think it is in the interest of the intelligence community to ask for a much more specific involvement of the Executive Branch and perhaps even the Congress in making judgments about general and longer range requirements and priorities, otherwise the community must assume responsibility for making assumptions about U.S. domestic attitudes and policies which are outside its purview.

5. One can view the requirements process from a slightly different perspective in order to integrate these other factors.

6. The current intelligence operation is on the one hand like running an underground newspaper. On the other hand, the collection and "requirements" side, it is the most directly responsive to policy and decision makers, operating on current problems and in highly specific terms. These intelligence operations support the situation we are involved in, whether by choice of the nation's leadership, or as a consequence of actions of others involving U.S. interests clearly. The element that has been removed here is anticipation. We do not need to guess what the U.S. needs will be, we are being told by those responsible for guiding the enterprise. The peripheral considerations also tend to be narrow. We can see much more clearly the probable direction of events and can more concisely allocate resources for the short term. But this is not the real problem area when we speak of defining requirements, it is the longer term question dealing with anticipated needs.

7. The intelligence analyst/report producer is an encyclopedic scholar in his field. He wants to maintain the widest possible data base, and he tends to be highly situation oriented by nature: the soldier prepares for the worst battle he can envision; the economist for crash and inflation; the political scientist for apathy or revolution, etc., etc. The analyst says, to cope with X situation, we would need to know so and so. The intelligence analyst/producer should be asked to make only one principal set of judgments. Assuming the occurrence of the situation he is equipped to deal with, what is critical to know and what is advantageous? This listing and priority ordering establishes what might be called outline of the optimum data base. Being situational in nature, this could embrace wartime, peacetime, political, economic, sociological, and other kinds of problems.

8. The next level of judgment to which the intelligence community can substantially contribute is an estimate of the probability of occurrence of given situations. The general trend of the actions of others

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gives us clues: knowledge of what is under consideration in the centers of power, potential power, or potentially disruptive influences provide tip-offs. Judgments in this area of national interest are currently being reflected in documents such as the Perspectives paper, KIQs, requests for NSSMs or study papers, and the selection of topics for other in-depth intelligence reports.

9. A key related level of judgment at this point takes the intelligence community into domestic politics: will U.S. leadership or public pressures select involvement if such-and-such a situation develops? To what degree? Or do we have to be very well informed just to prove that we are very well informed, although we really don't think the U.S. needs to or will do much about it? It is on this imponderable that the intelligence community should demand greater policy guidance, pinpointing the problem and its effect on resource allocation. The alternative, now being practiced, is application of simple budgetary constraints, leaving the substantive judgments to the technicians, who then bear the burdens should national leadership take an unforeseen tack.

10. Most of the requirements documents I have seen do a fair job of relating the substance of a given informational need to several layers of increasingly generalized objectives and goals. Many of them can be "justified" or "validated" by rational discussion if certain sets of assumptions are shared, but most often the underlying assumptions are ill-defined and not necessarily common to the community as a whole.

11. Our fundamental objective should be to design a requirements system which states all the assumptions and assigns more clearly the responsibility for making concise and explicit levels of judgment. An agency or department may best be able to judge how crucial individual items may be to the performance of a given mission, if and when it is called on to perform in explicit situations. But it cannot always be sure that national leadership will assign it the same mission it plans for itself. The intelligence community should be able to offer an opinion about the probability or trend of international situations. The community may also be able to venture an opinion about U.S. involvement, but it should request the executive and/or Congress to offer an explicit indication or confirmation of the probability of a major U.S. involvement or response.

12. Collection resources should be developed to meet the more probable involvements. Subsequent decisions about the employment of collection resources against these requirements might best be made by a high level intelligence community group including representatives of the major program managers, supported by NIO and USIB Committee expertise. This group should rarely have to meet, since ongoing evaluations by NIOs and USIB Committees would indicate desirable shifts in use of collection resources according to topic and situation, as would also the KIQ/KEP process.

13. It would seem that the really basic and broad statement of requirements would require review and endorsement only about once every two years. NSC action (i.e., tasking levied by NSC level officials, even if not always as the formal group) would give specific focus to level of operation and tasking in the interim periods. In this connection, there may be room for improvement in the technique for handling collection tasking. Policy makers quite often find a means of tasking program managers or sub-elements directly, making coherent management of resources difficult, and identification of the total workload subject to question when combined community planning is involved.

